Affiliation of Author(s):国际商学院
Journal:Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies
Funded by:国家自然科学基金项目
Abstract:We examine the influence of stock pledge by controlling shareholders on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Results show that firms exhibit poorer CSR performance when the controlling shareholders have more shares under pledge to financial institutions. Further analyses suggest that the negative relation between stock pledge and CSR only exists in financially constrained firms and non-state-owned firms, in which the pledging controlling shareholders have greater incentive to increase stock price and maintain their control rights. Our findings support a margin call hypothesis that firms tend to cut off CSR spending to improve short-term financial performance and reduce the risk of losing control rights.
Indexed by:Journal paper
Volume:1
Number of Words:20000
ISSN No.:2041-6156
Translation or Not:no
Date of Publication:2023-10-31
First Author:wenwen
Co-author:Lu Xie,Lijing Tong,Siting Zhang
